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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
live in honor and decency. They will not make the sacrifices neces-
sary for the preservation of democratic ideals. They will decline
into a worship of power. Fear will be their only motivation. The
strong will vanquish the weak and democracy will perish.
Men must know God's law and they must learn it in the homes
and in the schools. Secularization of the schools will produce mon-
strosities respectful of neither God nor man. Fear, hate and preju-
dice are the offspring of ignorance and if we are to keep our youth
ignorant of God this nation will perish through fear, hate and
prejudice.
Let us make religion a part of our school curricula, let us edu-
cate our citizens in the love of God and of country, and democracy
will survive its enemies from without and from within.
JOHN P. O'BYRNE.
SECTION 61-B OF THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW OF NEW YORK:
ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY AND APPLICABILITY IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
On April 9, 1944, a disastrous blow was dealt minority stock-
holders seeking to institute derivative actions in the courts of New
York State. On that day Governor Thomas E. Dewey signed the
bill which was later known as Section 61-b of the General Corpora-
tion Law of New York.' Since that time a bitter battle has been
raging as to (1) the constitutionality of the statute and (2) its ap-
plicability in the federal courts. Powerful and persuasive arguments
are put forth both by those who uphold the statute and by those who
seek to destroy it and the clash is one of exceptional interest.
1N. Y. GEN. Coap. LAW § 61-b: "In any action instituted or maintained
in the right of any foreign or domestic corporation by the holder or holders of
less than five per centum of the outstanding shares of any class of such cor-
poration's stock or voting trust certificates, unless the shares or voting trust
certificates held by such holder or holders have a market value in excess of
fifty thousand dollars, the corporation in whose right such action is brought
shall be entitled at any stage of the proceedings before final judgment to re-
quire the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such
action and by the other parties defendant in connection therewith for which
it may become subject pursuant to section sixty-four of this chapter, to which
the corporation shall have recourse in such amount as the court having juris-
diction shall determine upon the termination of such action. The amount of
such security may thereafter from time to time be increased or decreased in
the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such action upon showing
that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive."
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I. Legislative History
To fully appreciate the significance of the present controversy, a
knowledge of the background and origin of this statute is of prime
importance. Section 61-b was made law for the express purpose of
curtailing so-called "strike suits." A "strike suit" is an action, usu-
ally not founded on any meritorious claim, brought "on behalf" of a
corporation by one of its stockholders. Its purpose is not primarily
to attain benefit for the corporation but is rather the hope of forcing
the corporation into a lucrative private settlement. A stockholder
so inclined may arm himself with any slight irregularity remotely
resembling a violation of fiduciary duty on the part of the corporate
management and force the corporation to succumb to his groundless
threats, rather than go through a time-consuming, expensive and
often unpleasantly publicized litigation. In most cases his holdings
comprise an infinitesimal percentage of the total corporate stock.
Fees awarded to the stockholder's counsel in these suits are unduly
large and thus there are more than a few attorneys who, with every-
thing to gain and very little to lose, willingly bring suit even though
their client's claim may be wholly lacking in merit.2
The obvious evil of the whole situation has been readily recog-
nized by the courts 3 and attention focused on it by many articles
appearing in law school periodicals. 4  In 1942 the Chamber of Com-
merce of New York instituted an extensive investigation and survey
of stockholder derivative actions in New York and its conclusions
pointed to the need for legislative reformY Thus, on April 9, 1944,
Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, after stating that "a
2 "These fees are among the largest possible for practitioners in any field
of law. Any lawyer representing a stockholder, however small, in a corpora-
tion where a 'situation' is apparent has an opportunity to earn or share in these.
His own professional qualifications are unimportant, for if the case appears
to be colorably well founded, trial counsel of better standing and ability is
available. If it is not, there is still some chance of a nuisance value settlement.
With the wide range of financial transactions with which large corporations
are concerned and some ingenuity in finding reasons to criticize them, it is
not surprising that the flimsiest foundation of fact is not too weak for many
attorneys to base a hope of rewards of these proportions." WooD, SURVEY
AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIvATIVE Surrs 82 (1944).
3 See Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corporation, 6 F. Supp. 568 (E. D. N. Y.
1934) ; Weinberger v. Quinn, 264 App. Div. 405, 409, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 567, 572
(1st Dep't 1942), aff'd, 290 N. Y. 635, 49 N. E. 2d 131 (1943).
4Note, Extortionate Corporation Litigatioit: the Strike Suit, 34 COL. L.
RIv. 1308 (1934); Comment, Corporations-Right of Minority Stockholders
to Interfere in Corporate Management, 32 MicH. L. REV. 839 (1934) ; Berlack,
Stockholders' Suits: A Possible Substitute, 35 MiCH. L. REV. 597 (1937);
Washington, Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 25 CoRN. L. Q. 361 (1940).5 
WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOcKHoLDERs' DERIVATIVE SuITs
(for Special Committee on Corporate Litigation, Chamber of Commerce of
the State of New York, 1944). That this report was biased and its conclu-
sions not substantiated by facts, see Zlinkoff, The American. Investor and the
Con.stitutionality of Section 61-B of the New York General Corporation Law,
54 YALE L. 3. 352, 359-372 (1945).
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veritable racket of baseless lawsuits accompanied by many unethical
practices" had grown up in the field of stockholder suits, signed two
bills designed to curb the "great abuse and malodorous scandal" 6
connected with such actions. The first of these requires that the
plaintiff be "a stockholder at the time of the transaction of which he
complains or that his stock thereafter devolved upon him by opera-
tion of law" 7 and the second, subsequently Section 61-b, gives the
corporate defendant the right to require security for expenses, in-
cluding counsel fees, whenever the plaintiff-stockholder does not own
5% of the outstanding corporate stock or stock having a market value
of $50,000. These expenses also include the expenses of the indi-
vidual defendants for which the corporation may become liable.s As
is usually the case when legislation concerning corporations is enacted
in New York, other states were not slow in adopting similar statutory
provisions.9
II. Constitutionality
The effect of these statutes has been to drastically curtail minor-
ity stockholder actions in the state courts,' 0 and whether the legisla-
tures have gone too far in bringing about such a result is an issue
that has provoked much conflicting thought."
Until the recent decision of the Court of Appeals of New York
in Lapchak v. Baker,'2 the lower courts of that state had not been in
harmony regarding the constitutionality of Section 61-b.13 In that
6 PuBLc PAPERS OF GOVERNOR DEWEY 255 (1944), and Governor's Memo-
randum, immediately following text of N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61-b.
, Subsequently part of N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61. This provision cor-
responds to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1), long in force in the federal courts.
8 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 64 entitles the directors, officers or employees
of a corporation to assess their reasonable expenses in these actions against
the corporation, except where they have been adjudged liable for negligence
or misconduct in the performance of their duties.
9 N. J. Rsv. STAT. § 14:3-15 (Cum. Supp. 1948); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12,
§ 1322 (Cum. Supp. 1948) (stockholder must own 5% of stock, with no alterna-
tive exemption for owning stock having a specified market value) ; MD. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAWS Art. 16, § 195 (Cum. Supp. 1947) (stockholder required
to own 59o of stock or stock having a value of $25,000; excludes security for
attorneys' fees).
10 Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COL. L.
REv. 1 (1947).
11 Zlinkoff, The Anerican Investor and the Constitutionalitky of Section 61-B
of the New York General Corporation Law. 54 YALE L. J. 352 (1945) ; Horn-
stein, The Death Knell o.f Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32
CALIF. L. REv. 123 (1944); Carson, Further Phases of Derivative Actions
Against Directors, 29 CORN. L. Q. 431 (1944) ; 58 HARV. L. REv. 135 (1944).
12298 N. Y. 89, 80 N. E. Zd 751 (1948).
3 Constitutional: Matter of Baker v. Macfadden Publications, 270 App.
Div. 440, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 841 (1st Dep't 1946), leave to appeal denied, 270 App.
Div. 840, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 911 (1st Dep't 1946) ; Isensee v. Long Island- Motion
Picture Co., 184 Misc. 625, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Shielcrawt
v. Moffett, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944), af'd, 268 App. Div. 352, 51
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case the constitutionality of the statute was upheld by a unanimous
decision. The opinion of the court was surprisingly brief and con-
tained neither discussion nor refutation of the strong arguments sub-
mitted to show the unconstitutionality of the statute. The court was
content with merely stating that it would not question the wisdom of
the legislature in enacting the statute and that it was not so palpably
arbitrary or unduly discriminatory as to warrant holding it unconsti-
tutional. However, a conclusive judicial determination as to the con-
stitutionality of Section 61-b and similar statutes in other states has
not yet been reached. There is at present pending in the United
States Supreme Court a case in which the constitutionality of a New
Jersey statute 14 almost identical to Section 61-b is one of the prin-
cipal issues.1i
Regarding its application to suits pending at the time it took
effect, Section 61-b was interpreted as not applying to actions insti-
tuted before the date of its passage.16 The New Jersey statute above
referred to is specifically retroactive. Doubt has arisen as to the
validity of such a provision 7 and that question is also before the
United States Supreme Court in the case already adverted to.
The constitutionality of Section 61-b is attacked on several
grounds. One argument adduced by those who hold that it is un-
constitutional is that it violates the "due process" clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution in that the burden
imposed upon the stockholder is so severe that, in effect, the courts
are closed to him. Regarding this alleged burden, those who reject
this viewpoint cite Governor Dewey's statement in approving the bill
that "if his action has any merit at all, it should be easy enough to
interest others who do hold at least 5%, or stock valued at
$50,000." 18 However, practically speaking, to do this is not as
"easy" as it sounds. It would seem that merely contacting 5% of
the stockholders, apart from convincing them of the merits of one's
cause, would involve considerable time, labor and expense. Further-
more, in many cases where small corporations or close corporations
are involved it would be virtually impossible to interest 5% of the
stockholders, since in these corporations the stock is ordinarily con-
centrated in the hands of a few individuals, which individuals are
N. Y. S. 2d 188 (1st Dep't 1944), rezfd on other grounds, 294 N. Y. 180, 61
N. E. 2d 435 (1945); Wolf v. Atkinson, 182 Misc. 675, 49 N. Y. S. Zd 703
(Sup. Ct. 1944). Unconstitutional: Citron v. Mangel Stores Corporation, 50
N. Y. S. 2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
4 N. J. REv. STAT. § 14:3-15 (Cum. Supp. 1948).
15 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 170 F. 2d 44 (C. A. 3d
1948), cert. granted, - U. S. -, 93 L. ed. 526 (1949).
16 Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N. Y. 180, 61 N. E. 2d 435 (1945), motion
for reargument denied, 294 N. Y. 840, 62 N. E. 2d 392 (1945).
17 See Noel Associates v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 654, 53 N. Y. S. 2d
143, 151 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
28 Governor's Memorandum, immediately following text of N. Y. GEN.
CoRP. LAW § 61-b.
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usually the ones who manage the corporation and against whom the
minority stockholder contemplates suit.
There can be no doubt that in most cases the effect of this stat-
ute is to bar the minority stockholder from bringing suit, irrespec-
tive of what his motives may be. To hold otherwise would be to
close one's eyes to the realities of the situation. Not only may lack
of financial resources prevent the poorer stockholder from posting
security, but it may also disable him from spreading his views to
fellow stockholders. Assuming that a stockholder in a large corpo-
ration does not meet the statutory requirement of stock ownership
but is financially able to hurdle the obstacle of submitting security,
he is still under a statutory threat so pronounced that in most in-
stances, no matter how valid his claim may be, he will shy away from
suit. If he is successful in his anticipated suit the most he will re-
cover is a few cents a share on his stock; but if he loses the suit he
forfeits the security posted, which in some cases passes the $100,000
mark. The scales are too unevenly weighted against him and the
prudent stockholder will ordinarily not take the risk involved. When
an individual has a right to enter court to protect his property, that
right cannot be pushed to the point of disappearance by oppressive
penalties. 19 If the minority stockholder has such a right to protect
his interest in a corporation by bringing a derivative suit, then in
many cases Section 61-b renders such right a mere illusion, despite
the absence of a literal liquidation in the statute.
However, the right of a minority stockholder to litigate a cause
of action belonging to his corporation is far from being the right
which the "due process" clause protects. It is not an absolute or
unqualified right. It had its origin in equity and equitable considera-
tions determine each case. To hold that merely because one owns
stock in a corporation entitles him under the Constitution to bring
suit on behalf of the corporation would be to fly in the teeth of fed-
eral enactments which heretofore have not been attacked as being
invalid. Section 23 (b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires the plaintiff-stockholder to own the stock at the time of the
transaction of which he complains. If a stockholder has an inherent
right to bring suit on behalf of the corporation in order to protect
his own interest, how can such a rule be constitutionally sustained?
Viewing the situation logically, a stockholder acquiring stock subse-
quent to a violation of fiduciary duty by the corporate management
has just as much interest in seeing to it that the situation is rectified
as has the stockholder who owned stock at the time of the violation.
19 Wadley Southern Railway Co. v. State of Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 661,
59 L. ed. 405, 411 (1915), wherein it was stated that ". . . in whatever method
enforced, the right to a judicial review must be substantial, adequate, and
safely available; but that right is merely nominal and illusory if the party to
be affected can appeal to the courts only at the risk of having to pay penalties
so great that it is better to yield to orders of uncertain legality rather than to
ask for the protection of the law."
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If the subsequent stockholder is validly barred from bringing suit,
it must be because he has no right which the "due process" clause
protects. If the stockholder in that instance is not aided by the "due
process" clause, it is difficult to see how he can avail of it in the
situation in which he finds himself as a result of Section 61-b. Sec-
tion 23(b) (1) was the result of a realistic approach to the same goal
which Section 61-b seeks to attain, viz., the curbing of abuse in
derivative actions, and it would seem that the same recognition ac-
corded Section 23(b) (1) should be given Section 61-b.
Another contention is that the statute denies equal protection of
the laws, the claim being that it unduly discriminates against the small
stockholder. Though legislatures have the power to make classifica-
tion, such classification must bear a direct and reasonable relation to
the object of the legislation. 20 In applying this principle, those who
hold the classification to be constitutional reason that the legislature
found the evil of extortionate "strike suits" to be the product merely
of the small stockholders and not of the larger stockholders and that,
therefore, the classification has a direct and reasonable relation to the
legislative intent, for assuredly if only suits brought by small stock-
holders are obnoxious, then only such suits should be curtailed.
21
Their reasoning is that a stockholder owning 5% of the corporate
stock or stock having a market value of $50,000 has more of a per-
sonal interest in the outcome of a derivative suit than has a stock-
holder not meeting the statutory minimum and that, therefore, a suit
instigated by him is more apt to have a meritorious foundation. This
may be true if we confine our analysis to one corporation. However,
when we hypothetically compare the interest of a stockholder in one
corporation with another's interest in a different corporation, a
marked fallacy in this line of,reasoning appears. For example, one
can readily visualize that a stockholder owning but 3% of a corpora-
tion's stock may be in a position to gain much more by a derivative
suit than a stockholder owning 5% of the stock of another corpora-
tion in a similar suit. This is so because taken alone neither the
percentage of the stock one owns in a corporation nor the market
value of that stock presents a sound criterion for estimating one's
financial interest in the outcome of a litigation. Both the assets of
the particular corporation and the amount at stake in suit are im-
portant considerations. The easily imagined possibility then is that
stockholder A, who stands to gain $1,000 by a successful derivative
suit, is barred from bringing one because he owns but 3% of the cor-
porate stock, whereas stockholder B, who stands to gain but $500,
20 Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207, 214, 90 L. ed. 6, 13
(1945); Frost v. Corporation Connission, 278 U. S. 515, 522, 73 L. ed. 483,
488 (1929); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 402, 72
L. ed. 927, 930 (1928).
21 See Isensee v. Long Island Motion Picture Co., 184 Misc. 625, 629, 54
N. Y. S. 2d 556, 560 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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may bring suit because he owns 5% of the stock. Thus it would seem
that the "personal interest" argument does not have much potency.
Those who believe the statute to be unconstitutional contend that
the purpose of the legislature was simply to curtail baseless derivative
actions and that by hindering all small stockholders desiring to bring
suit, irrespective of the merit of their claims, the classification goes
too far in achieving such purpose. 22 They conclude that the object
of the legislation is attained in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner,
i.e., baseless derivative actions are done away with by doing away
with all derivative actions so far as stockholders unable to meet the
statutory requirements are concerned. " As one writer has aptly put
it, Section 61-b and similar statutes "throw the baby out with the
bath." 23 In addition, there is nothing to prevent a stockholder meet-
ing the statutory requirements from bringing a groundless suit. It
is also argued that the statute discriminates against the poorer stock-
holder. In many cases the test for bringing suit is not whether or
not the stockholder's claim is meritorious, but rather the decisive
question is does he have enough money to post the security demanded.
Of course, any arbitrary distinction based on wealth and involving
the right to judicial review has always met with severe condemna-
tion 24 and if no other considerations were present, it would surely
seem that Section 61-b is invalid.
However, the real test is whether the statutory classification is
reasonable; if it is, the fact that the wealthier stockholder gains an
incidental advantage is immaterial. To protect the public, legisla-
tures may be forced to pass statutes which by their very nature work
to the disadvantage of individuals with limited financial means. 25
That statutes or decisions may work a hardship on a few in particu-
lar instances for the sake of protecting the many is not an unfamiliar
principle.
In New York many rights of stockholders are governed by statu-
tory requirements of minimum ownership. 26 It has never been seri-
ously contended that these statutes are constitutionally invalid. Such
statutes were enacted not only to prevent abuse by the stockholder,
but also so that corporate affairs might be run more smoothly and
effectively, unhampered by multitudinous claims. It was such a prac-
22 Citron v. Mangel Stores Corp., 50 N. Y. S. 2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
23 Wolfson, Striking out "strike suits" Fortune, March, 1949, p. 138, col. 3.
24See Cotting v. Godard, 183 U. S. 79, 100, 101, 46 L. ed. 92, 105, 106
(1901).
25 Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U. S. 98, 77 L. ed. 1058 (1933), wherein the
court upheld the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance making the filing
of a surety company bond in the sum of $200,000 a condition of the right to
drill a gas or oil well within the city limits.
26 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 10, 113 limit the right of inspection of stock
books to stockholders of record for at least six months or those holding or
authorized by 5% of the outstanding shares. N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAw § 77
gives stockholders owning 3% of the shares of a corporation the right to
request a statement of its affairs.
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tical necessity that resulted in the passage of Section 61-b. Some
limitation on stockholder suits was necessary and experience and
careful observation dictated to the legislature what that limitation was
to be and it is in this light that their determination may be justified.
It is true that a stockholder meeting the statutory requirements
may bring a groundless suit. However, this in and of itself does not
indicate that the statute is invalid. It is not necessary that a statute
be without imperfection in striving to remedy a particular situation.
2 7
As previously stated, all that is required is that the statutory classifi-
cation rest on some reasonable foundation.
Any question involving the constitutionality of a statute neces-
sarily entails consideration of a great number of legal principles, and
the foregoing represents nothing more than a preliminary approach
to the core of the problem. The issue is indeed a controversial one
and it is not easy to arrive, at least with any degree of certitude, at
a conclusion as to which of the views above discussed are correct.
It must be remembered that at present the derivative stockholder suit
is the only civil remedy the minority stockholder has for corporate
mismanagement.28 Therefore, one should deliberate with much cau-
tion before approving any legislative action tending to curb or deny
this remedy. On the other hand, there is undeniably a need for re-
form. That corporations are severely damaged financially and other-
wise by baseless suits there can be no doubt. The fact that corporate
directors and officers, harassed by these suits, are unable to devote
proper time and effort to their duties is but one example of the many
ways by which the corporation is injured. In a New York case the
court allowed an amicable settlement and a substantial award of fees
to plaintiffs' counsel, although stating that it was "reasonably certain
that the plaintiffs would not be successful in the litigation." 2 Apart
from the remote possibility that plaintiffs could recover, the court
was persuaded in reaching its conclusion by a "consideration of the
expenditure of time and money and the risks attendant upon a trial
of issues." 30
Those opposed to the statute offer no adequate remedy for the
conceded abuse that existed before its passage. Indeed the root of
the whole problem under discussion may be traced to the fact that
there seems to be no plan or remedy which will adequately distribute
27 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 400, 81 L. ed. 703,
713 (1937).28 See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 2, 4 (Sup. Ct. 1944). "The stock-
holder's suit is, at present, the only practical way of permitting the small
stockholder to question controlling stockholders and directors." Rosenman, J.,
lecture before the Practicing Lawyers Institute, Jan. 28, 1942. "It [stockholder
action] is the only existent means for bringing officers and directors of large
corporations to account." Wolfson, Striking out "strike suits", Fortune,
March, 1949, p. 140, col. 2.
29 Diamond v. Davis, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 181, 193 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
30 Ibid.
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justice to all concerned. The ramifications of a stockholder suit are
so diverse that a perfect plan seems impossible. Unquestionably some
statutory regulation is necessary and the scheme embodied in Section
61-b, though admittedly far from satisfactory, does seem the best
available. In expressing an opinion that the provisions of 61-b are
"mandatory and discriminatory" and "likely to do more harm than
good," a federal judge 31 suggested that as a substitute the states
simply adopt the federal rule outlawing private settlements.3 2 In
this connection, the Court of Appeals of New York has ruled that a
plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative action shall be held accountable
to the corporation for any money received by him in private settle-
ment for the discontinuance of the action.33 The effect of this, of
course, is to greatly discourage any one who might bring suit in the
hope of a private settlement, and to practically do away with the need
for the statutory revision suggested. Unfortunately, however, doing
away with private settlements represents only a partial solution of
the problem. There still remains the shameful waste of time, expense
and energy expended by corporations in fighting groundless claims.
If Section 61-b should be declared unconstitutional, one result will
stand out coldly and clearly: the minority stockholder and his at-
torney will be free once again to speculate at the expense of the cor-
poration practically unhampered by any statutory restriction. On
the other hand, the conclusion is inescapable that there will be in-
stances in which the statute will work a severe hardship on a minority
stockholder having a good cause of action. Ultimately the whole
problem of constitutionality can be resolved into one question: Should
innocent minority stockholders occasionally be made to suffer in order
to eradicate an abuse affecting the interests of an innumerable number
of persons? By its decision in Lapchak v. Baker the Court of Appeals
of New York held Section 61-b not to be so arbitrary or discrimina-
tory as to be violative of either the "due process" or "equal pro-
tection" clause of the Constitution. After some hesitation, we accede
in this view.
III. Applicability in the Federal Courts
Assuming Section 61-b and like statutes in other states to be
constitutional, a way still remains to substantially cripple their effec-
tiveness. The contention is made by many that these statutes are
procedural in nature and not substantive and, therefore, not enforce-
able by a federal court under the rule laid down in Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins.3 4 The importance of this issue is readily envisioned when
31 Judge Leibell in Craftsman Finance & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F.
Supp. 168, 178 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
33 Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N. Y. 146, 71 N: E. 2d 443 (1947).
34304 U. S. 64, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938).
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it is realized that in New York, for example, a great many of the
corporations doing business there have been incorporated without the
state and that it would not be too difficult for a minority stockholder
residing in New York to gain entrance in the federal courts on the
basis of diversity of citizenship.
Concededly, to ascertaii whether a statute of this type is pro-
cedural or substantive is a difficult undertaking. In its report to the
United States Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee on Rules for
Civil Procedure, in considering whether a federal limitation on stock-
holder derivative actions 35 was substantive or procedural, decided
that it could not answer the question with certainty and felt that
rather than recommending any change in the rule it would be prefer-
able to wait until the Supreme Court itself decided the matter in
a litigation.30
That the problem is a perplexing one is further borne out by
the hopeless conflict found in the reported decisions on this issue. In
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York there is one case holding that the statute is procedural and
therefore unenforceable in the federal courts 3 and two others
wherein the court also declined to enforce the statute, holding that
its applicability is discretionary with the court.8 8  A decision of the
District Court of the Eastern District of New York required the
plaintiff to post security, agreeing with the Southern District cases
which held that the statute's applicability is a matter of discretion,
and on the further ground that where a statute reflects the public
policy of a state it should be enforced in the federal courts.39 A de-
cision by the District Court of New Jersey holding that the statute
was remedial in nature and therefore not enforceable was reversed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on the
theory that federal courts should recognize and give force to the
35 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1), which requires the plaintiff to aver that he
"was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that
his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law. .. ."
385 F. R. D. 433, 449. The Committee discussed Section 61-b but did not
reach a conclusion as to whether it was procedural or substantive.
37 Boyd v. Bell, 64 F. Supp. 22 (S. D. N. Y. 1945). See also Thompson
v. Broadfoot, 165 F. 2d 744 (C. C. A. 2d 1948) referring to an unreported
Southern District decision involving the same parties which refused to enforce
§ 61-b on the ground that it was procedural.38 Azarow v. Sherneth Corp., 8 F. R. D. 247 (S. D. N. Y. 1948), and
Craftsman Finance & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S. D. N. Y.
1945).
39 Donovan v. Queensboro Corp., 75 F. Supp. 131 (E. D. N. Y. 1947).
The court also held that even if § 61-b were to be considered procedural, since
there was no equivalent federal rule, the court would be bound to recognize
the same under a local rule of the court requiring it to accept state procedure
in the absence of equivalent federal procedure. The United States Supreme
Court denied plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari in this case, - U. S.
-, 93 L. ed. 26 (1948), but issues other than those under discussion were also
before the court, a consideration of which quite possibly resulted in the denial.
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public policy of a state.40 For the view that the statute is procedural
and unenforceable there is also the concurring opinion of Judge Frank
in a case decided in the then Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.4 '
Thus we see that on the question of the applicability of Section
61-b in the federal courts three irreconcilable views have been
adopted, namely, (1) that it is not enforceable in the federal courts,
(2) that it must be enforced in the federal courts, and (3) that its
enforceability is discretionary with the federal court. In addition,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have reached
exactly opposite conclusions with regard to the question of the ap-
pealability of a ruling by the district court on the issue under dis-
cussion. The second circuit, by a divided court, held a district
court decision denying the right to have security not appealable,
basing its conclusion on the ground that the defendant corporation
could not be harmed by waiting until the merits of the case were
decided.42  The court for the third circuit under like circumstances
reasoned that the question of security was an issue entirely distinct
from the main cause of action and therefore subject to review irre-
spective of the progress of the rest of the case.43 It would seem that
the third circuit view is the better one. Judge Frank, concurring in
a subsequent second circuit decision, 44 pointed out the fallacy in the
reasoning of the majority in the previous ruling by stating that the
corporation could be harmed in that the minority stockholder might
not appeal an adverse decision on the merits of the case and the cor-
poration then would be in a precarious position as far as recovering
its counsel fees and other expenses was concerned.
We disagree with the contention that Section 61-b and similar
statutes should not be enforced in the federal courts. To begin with,
there are many federal cases in which statutes providing for attor-
ney's fees have been treated as being substantive.45  No satisfactory
40 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 170 F. 2d 44 (C. A. 3d
1948), reversing 7 F. R. D. 352 (D. N. J. 1947).
41 Aspinook Corporation v. Bright, 165 F. 2d 294 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U. S. 846, 92 L. ed. 579 (1948).
42 This is an unreported decision, but is referred to in Aspinook Corpora-
tion v. Bright, 165 F. 2d 294 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), which decided an issue arising
out of the same litigation.
43 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 170 F. 2d 44 (C. A. 3d 1948).44 Aspinook Corporation v. Bright, 165 F. 2d 294 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
cert. denied, 333 U. S. 846, 92 L. ed. 579 (1948).
45 Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U. S. 238, 243, 72 L. ed. 547,
551 (1928), wherein the Court held that "Disregarding mere matters of form
it is clear that it is the policy of the state to allow plaintiffs to recover an
attorney's fee in certain cases, and it has made that policy effective by making
the allowance of the fee mandatory on its courts in those cases. It would be
at least anomalous if this policy could be thwarted and the right so plainly
given destroyed by removal of the cause to the federal courts."; Home Life
Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 188 U. S. 726, 47 L. ed. 667 (1903) ; Iowa Life Insurance
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distinction can be found between those cases and cases involving the
statutes here under consideration.
The cases holding that the federal judge has discretion as to
whether or not Section 61-b should be enforced in the federal
courts 40 are devoid of any convincing reason for such a conclusion
and it would seem that no sound basis exists in their support.
The purpose of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins was "to insure that, in
all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely be-
cause of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the
litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far
as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if
tried in a State court." 47 Since the Erie decision the United States
Supreme Court has held that in diversity cases the federal courts
must follow state law as to burden of proof, 48 as to conflict of laws,49
and as to contributory negligence.10
In Guaranty Trust Company v. York 51 the United States Su-
preme Court held that whether or not a statute of limitations is con-
sidered substantive or procedural is immaterial and that the decisive
question is "does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a
federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling
in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State
court?" 52 (Emphasis supplied.) Using this test, the late Judge
Bright in Boyd v. Bell 53 held that Section 61-b did not "significantly
affect" the merits of the controversy between the minority stockholder
and the individual defendants and that, therefore, Section 61-b was
unenforceable in the federal courts. It is true that the statute does
not affect the merits of the issues between the plaintiff and the in-
dividual defendants, but it obviously affects the result of the litigation
as between the plaintiff and the corporate defendant. For example, in
one federal case 5 4 defendant corporation requested that security in
the amount of $125,000 be posted. If its request were denied and
at the end of the litigation it were out that amount, could it be said
Co. v. Lewis, 187 U. S. 335, 47 L. ed. 204 (1902); Fidelity Mut. Life Assn.
v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308, 46 L. ed. 922 (1902); Associated Mfrs. Corp. v.
De Jong, 64 F. 2d 64 (C. C. A. 8th 1933); Pond v. Goldstein, 41 F. 2d 76
(C. C. A. 9th 1930); Business Men's Assur. Co. v. Campbell, 18 F. 2d 223
(C. C. A. 8th 1927).46 Azarow v. Sherneth Corporation, 8 F. R. D. 247 (S. D. N. Y. 1948);
Craftsman Finance & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S. D. N. Y.
1945); Donovan v. Queensboro Corp., 75 F. Supp. 131 (E. D. N. Y. 1947),
cert. denied, - U. S. -, 93 L. ed. 26 (1948).
47 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109, 89 L. ed. 2079, 2086
(1945).
48 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208, 84 L. ed. 196 (1939).
4 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U. S. 487, 85 L. ed. 1477 (1941).
50 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 87 L. ed. 645 (1943).
51,326 U. S. 99, 89 L. ed. 2079 (1945).5 2 1d. at 109, 89 L. ed. at 2086.
53 64 F. Supp. 22 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
54 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 170 F. 2d 44 (C. A. 3d 1948).
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that the result was substantially the same as it would have been had
effect been given to the statute?
In the York case the Court held that "since a federal court
adjudicating a State-created right solely because of the diversity of
citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another
court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover
is made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the
enforcement of the right as given by the State" " or, in other words,
that a right without a remedy is no right at all for purposes of en-
forcement by a diversity suit in a federal court sitting in the state.
This is rather compelling language for the view that Section 61-b
should be enforced in the federal courts. However, a portion of the
opinion stated that "State law cannot define the remedies which a
federal court must give simply because a federal court in diversity
jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal to the State's
courts." 56 This latter language has been criticized by at least one
federal court as being inconsistent with the conclusion arrived at in
that case.5 7 It would seem to be unnecessary to determine whether
or not such criticism is well founded, for in the recent case of Angel
v. Bullington 58 the Supreme Court clearly indicated that the Erie
doctrine extends far beyond a mere application to state substantive
law. In that case the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that
a statute of that state barring a mortgagee from a deficiency judg-
ment was valid because it was procedural in its nature, being a mere
limitation of the jurisdiction of the state courts. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court denied plaintiff access to the state courts under
the statute and the United States Supreme Court held that this de-
nial barred plaintiff from bringing a new suit in the federal courts.
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court held that diversity jurisdic-
tion must follow state law and policy and that if North Carolina has
prohibited deficiency judgments within its borders then a federal
court in North Carolina must follow this policy. Section 61-b clearly
represents a very important public policy of the State of New York
and, under the rule just enunciated, if a minority stockholder is not
able to have access to the New York courts then the federal courts
should also be unavailable to him.
IV. Section 61-b Should be Enforced in the Federal Courts
From the foregoing it is clear that federal courts in diversity
cases should not be concerned with precise differentiations between
55326 U. S. 99, 108, 89 L. ed. 2079, 2086 (1945).
56 Id. at 106, 89 L. ed. at 2084.
57 Houseware Sales Corporation v. Quaker Stretcher Co., 70 F. Supp. 747,
750 (E. D. Wis. 1947).
5s330 U. S. 183, 91 L. ed. 832 (1947). See Note, Angel v. Bullington,
State Limitation on Federal Jurisdiction, 21 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 184 (1947).
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procedural and substantive law, but rather should seek to bring about
substantially the same results as would obtain in a state court. By
refusing to enforce Section 61-b a federal court may change the en-
tire complexion of a case. On. the one hand, if the court refuses to
enforce the statute, the defendant corporation stands to lose a very
substantial sum in counsel fees, and on the other hand, if the court
does enforce it and plaintiff is unable to meet the statutory require-
ments, the case will be at an end. The result brought about by the
ruling in Boyd v. Bell and the result that would have been brought
about had the case been tried in a state court are strikingly at vari-
ance and assuredly the federal court there was far from being
"another court of the state."
Adding emphasis to the rule that whether or not a statute is
considered substantive or procedural is immaterial, the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that a federal court in a diversity
case should enforce the public policy of the state. The public policy
of the State of New York will be completely ignored if Boyd v. Bell
is to be followed.
The clash of authority both on the issue of applicability and on
the issue of appealability makes it apparent that a decision by the
United States Supreme Court will be required to decisively settle the
controversy and it is hoped that such a decision will soon be
forthcoming 9
THOMAS A. BOLAN.
REHABILITATION OF WITNESSES
MAY AN IMPEACHED, CONTRADICTED OR DISCREDITED WITNESS BE
REHABILITATED BY SHOWING THAT HE HAS MADE DECLARATIONS OUT
OF COURT WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH HIS TESTIMONY?
I. The General Rule
In England and in this jurisdiction until the latter part of the
18th and early part of the 19th centuries, it had been the practice of
the courts to allow the testimony of a witness to be corroborated or
confirmed by permitting the introduction of declarations of the wit-
ness made out of court, whether under oath or not, of the same tenor
as the testimony then being given.1 This appears to have been done
59 The Supreme Court has an opportunity to decide these questions in the
pending case of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation.
I People v. Vane, 12 Wend. 78 (N. Y. 1834) ; Jackson v. Etz, 5 Cow. 314
(N. Y. 1826); Knox's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 763, 790 (1679); Lutterell v.
Reynell, 1 Mod. 282, 86 Eng. Rep. 887 (1671).
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